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Adventures in Resolving Redundancy: Case vs. the EPP* 
Thomas McFadden 
1 The redundancy and previous attempts to get rid of it 
This paper is concerned with the two principles that are generally assumed 
to regulate the surface distribution of DPs, syntactic Case (a requirement that 
every DP be structurally licensed), and the EPP (a requirement that (certain) 
clauses have a subject, or perhaps that certain functional heads have a speci-
fier). Much recent work, which I will discuss in this section, has been directed 
at reducing the redundancy in the coverage of these two principles by finding 
ways to do without the EPP. However, as I will show in Section 2, certain cru-
cial assumptions which underlie this work are incorrect. In Section 3 I will 
propose instead that, if anything, we should try to do without syntactic Case, 
and in Section 4 I will discuss data which present a challenge to such a move 
and suggest how we might go about dealing with them in a Case-less theory. 
It is well known that syntactic Case and the EPP are largely redundant in 
their regulation of the distribution of DPs. This is especially clear in instances 
of raising to subject: 
(1) a. * seems to be John ill. 
b. John seems to be ill. 
Sentence 1a could be ruled out because John is not in a position where Case 
can be assigned or checked, but it could just as easily be ruled out because there 
is no subject to satisfy the EPP in the matrix clause. Both objections are satis-
fied by raising John as in 1 b. 1 This leads us to question whether both principles 
are really needed. In fact, a number of researchers (e.g. Martin ( 1999), Epstein 
and Seely (1999), Grohmann, Drury and Castillo (2000), Boeckx (2000) and 
Bo~kovic (2001)) have argued in this connection that we might be able to do 
without the EPP, proposing various means to account for those effects of the 
principle that are not strictly redundant with those of Case. 
•I would like to thank Tony Kroch, Dave Embick and the audience at PLC26 for 
comments and discussion. 
1In recent versions of Minimalism (Chomsky 2000, 2001), Case features appear 
only on DPs (not on T), and they can be checked off without movement under Agree. 
Thus it is only the EPP feature on T that actually drives raising to subject. Still, once a 
DP has its Case feature checked off it is no longer visible for attraction by EPP features. 
Thus in l b, unchecked Case allows the raising, while the EPP forces it. 
U. Penn Working Papers in Linguistics, Volume 9.1, 2003 
138 THOMAS MCFADDEN 
The stated motivation for choosing to eliminate the EPP in favor of Case 
is that the former is, at present, a stipulation. Specifically, despite attempts to 
derive its effects from requirements on syntactic predication, 2 the EPP remains 
little more than the descriptive statement that certain functional heads require 
subjects. It is thus reasoned that, if the full empirical coverage of the EPP could 
be derived from syntactic Case and other independent principles of grammar, 
this stipulation could be eliminated and our theory of grammar simplified . 
. The authors cited above differ considerably in the details on how exactly this 
should be done, but at least the following three issues must be dealt with. 
First, one must capture the requirement on surface subjects in finite clauses. 
The raising of John in lb can be driven by that DP's need for Case, but some-
thing else is needed to drive the insertion of expletives: 
(2) a. * Is raining. 
b. It is raining. 
(3) a. *Seems that no one is home. 
b. It seems that no one is home. 
The verb in 2 takes no thematic argument, so there is no DP that could require 
Case, and in 3 the only argument in the sentence, no one, gets Case just fine 
in the subordinate clause, yet both sentences are bad unless an expletive is 
inserted to fill the highest subject position. Generally, in the absence of the 
EPP, the so-called Inverse Case Filter is used to account for this, according 
to which those heads which can assign Case must assign Case. Note that in 
addition to being difficult to distinguish conceptually from the EPP, the ICF is 
informulable under certain recent versions of Minimalism. 3 
Second, an explanation is required for why John must appear before to in 
the following sentences: 
(4) a. *I expect to John be late. 
2See Rothstein (1983) and Heycock (1991). The standard argument against such 
an account is that, since the EPP can be satisfied by semantically null expletives, 
predication-based attempts to 'explain' the EPP are doomed to failure. However, predi-
cation as intended here is not a semantic notion. Heycock explicitly speaks of syntactic 
predication, which may in turn have its origins in discourse rather than semantics (as 
suggested by Tony Kroch, p.c.). In any case, while it is true that the ultimate motiva-
tions for the EPP remain unclear, Case is in no better shape, as will be seen below. 
3The standard formalization of the ICF is that the uninterpretable Case feature on 
T causes the derivation to crash if it is not deleted in the process of checking Case on a 
DP. However, as mentioned in footnote 1, Chomsky (2000,2001) argues that functional 
heads like T have no Case feature which could drive the ICF. Grohmann et al. (2000) 
use categorial and c/>-features to drive movement instead of the ICF. 
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b. I expect Johni to ti be late. 
Movement to the embedded subject position can be straightforwardly driven 
by the EPP. Those who would do without that principle are forced to assume 
that English has overt object shift. While there are, in fact, good arguments 
that some form of short OS occurs in English, the point remains a matter of 
controversy and intense research, and if Lasnik (2001) is correct, the move-
ment that does occur is in fact optional. Without the EPP this would still 
predict incorrectly that both 4a and 4b should be possible. See also Boeckx 
(2000), Boskovic (2001) for discussion of this rather thorny issue. 
Third, something must be said about Successive Cyclic Movement, the 
apparent fact that raising proceeds step-by-step through intermediate specifiers 
(examples from Boskovic (2001)): 
(5) The studentsi seem all ti to know French. 
( 6) a. Mary i seems to John [J p ti to appear to herself to be in the 
room]. 
b. * Mary i seems to John [1 p ~ to appear to himself to be in the 
room] . 
The position of all in 5 is frequently explained by assuming that the students 
has moved through that position and stranded the quantifier there. Similarly, 
the availability of the anaphor herself in the embedded clause in 6a, and the im-
possibility of himself in 6b follow if Mary has moved through the intermediate 
specifier leaving a trace that binds the anaphor in the first example and blocks 
binding by a higher antecedent in the second. This SCM has been derived 
by saying that the EPP applies in every intermediate clause. Boeckx (2000) 
and Boskovic (2001) have tried to circumvent this dependence on the EPP by 
deriving SCM from general constraints on movement, while Grohmann et al. 
(2000) and Epstein and Seely (1999) deny the existence of SCM altogether. 
However, even if ways can be found to deal with these three issues sat-
isfactorily, a deeper problem remains. Specifically, the basic assumption on 
which the aforementioned attempts to eliminate the EPP are founded is in-
correct. It is posited that syntactic Case is indispensable and well-motivated 
in ways that the EPP is not. Yet beside the claims that the EPP is stipulative 
and poorly understood there is conspicuously little discussion of how Case 
might be any different. 4 It seems that the (tacit) basis for this assumption is 
4Martin (1999) is an exception in this regard. In addition to presenting empirical 
arguments for syntactic Case, he makes a suggestion as to why human language should 
have such an apparent imperfection. Curiously enough, as he points out himself, his 
suggestion applies equally well to the EPP. 
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the connection with morphological case. The existence of morphological case 
in many languages of the world is an empirical fact, and since the beginnings 
of Case theory, it has been argued that this is just a language-specific mani-
festation of the universal syntactic Case that licenses DPs. As long as this is 
correct, syntactic Case is indeed empirically indispensable. 5 However, as we 
will see in the next section, there is abundant evidence that this is not correct. 
2 But Case isn't case 
As a number of researchers (e.g Marantz (1991/2000), Harley ( 1995), Schiitze 
(1997) and Sigurosson (2001)) have shown, morphological case is not only 
distinct from syntactic Case, it is quite independent of it. The argument for 
divorcing the two is in three parts, which I present here in brief: 6 
First, the relationship between structural positions and particular morpho-
logical cases is not one-to-one but many-to-many. In languages like Icelandic, 
Japanese and Hindi, although the normal subject case is nominative, some 
structural subjects are dative. Furthermore, nominative case can mark certain 
structural objects. Sentence 7 conveniently shows both a non-nominative (in 
this instance dative) subject and a non-subject nominative: 
(7) Henni hefur alltaf }:>6tt Olafur leioinlegur. 
her:DAT has always thought Olaf:NOM boring 
'She has always found Olaf boring.' 
Zaenen, Maling and Thniinsson (1985) demonstrate on the basis of subject 
raising, reflexive binding, word order facts and several other diagnostics that 
the preverbal argument in such sentences is in fact the subject, yet it is marked 
dative, while the object is marked nominative. Indeed, it appears that Icelandic 
'structural' cases are not assigned according to structural positions at all, but 
rather according to a sequence or hierarchy. 7 
51 do not mean to imply that syntactic and morphological Case are assumed to be 
the same thing. Nonetheless, it has generally been assumed that the two are deeply 
connected, and that one can be derived from the other. 
6In this section I follow Schiitze's proposal to replace the term syntactic Case with 
DP-licensing in order to avoid confusion. 
7That is, after all lexical cases (like the quirky dative in 7) have been discharged, 
the highest remaining structural argument (regardless of whether it is in subject or 
object position) is assigned nominative, and the second highest, if there is one, is as-
signed accusative. See Zaenen, Maling and Thrainsson (1985), Yip, Maling and Jack-
endoff (1987), Marantz (1991/2000) and Bittner and Hale (1996) for analyses of this 
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Second, morphological case can be assigned to positions where no overt 
DP is licensed, as Sigurosson (1991) has shown: 8 
(8) a. Barninu batnaoi veikin einu. 
the-child:DAT recovered the-disease:NOM alone:DAT.NEUT 
'The child recovered from the disease alone.' 
b. Ao PRO batna veikin einum er erfitt. 
to PRO:DAT recover the-disease alone:DAT.MASC is difficult 
'To recover from the disease alone is difficult. 
The adjective einu in 8a agrees with the quirky dative subject Barninu of which 
it is predicated. Oddly enough, einum in 8b is dative as well, 9 even though 
there is no overt subject for it to agree with. Sigurosson argues convincingly 
that the adjective is agreeing with PRO, which thus must have been assigned 
dative case. This is troubling if, as is generally assumed, it is Case that licenses 
overt DPs. If, however, morphological case and DP-licensing are independent, 
it is unremarkable. 10 
Third, there is evidence that DPs can be licensed in positions where they 
are assigned no morphological case. Schtitze (1997, 2001) argues that every 
language has a default case which is inserted in the morphology on any DP 
which has not been assigned a case by the syntax. The best cross-linguistic 
evidence for this comes from left dislocated DPs. These typically match the 
case of the DP they are associated with, but when matching is blocked, a de-
fault case appears. Consider the following examples Schtitze gives from En-
glish (default case accusative) and German, Russian and Arabic (default case 
nominative): 
{9) Me, I like beans. 
(1 0) Der/*Dem Hans, mit dem spreche ich nicht mehr. 
the-NOM/*DAT Hans with him-DAT speak I not more 
'Hans, I don't speak with him anymore.' 
phenomenon. 
8 See Vanden Wyngaerd ( 1994) for similar data from Latin and Ancient Greek. 
9The difference in the forms of the endings reflects a difference in gender, not case. 
10Recall that in GB it was assumed that overt DPs appear in Case positions, PRO 
in non-Case positions. Even if we adopt instead the 'null Case' approach to the dis-
tribution of PRO developed in Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) and Martin (2001), it is 
clear that morphological case and DP licensing are operating independently here. The 
subject of batna receives dative case whether it is licensed to be overt or not. 
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(11) Vanja/?Vanju, ego jane ljublju. 
John-NOM/?ACC him-ACC I don't like 
'John, I don't like him.' 
(12) al-kitaab-u qara?t-u-hu. 
the-book-NOM read-1SG-it 
'The book, I read it.' 
There does not seem to be anything in the left-dislocation construction 
that could be assigning these cases, and crucially, the case that appears here in 
each language is the case that shows up in that language in other environments 
that lack a case-assigner. 11 The easiest explanation is therefore that the rele-
vant case is supplied in such environments as a morphological default. Cru-
cially, however, note that a default can never license anything. The concepts 
of default and licenser are simply incompatible. If a default case is available, 
it will be supplied in all instances where no case has been assigned, thereby 
'licensing' everything. 
Given this three part argument, we must conclude that the previously as-
sumed link between morphological case and syntactic Case was illusory. 12 
Now, taken by itself, this does not mean that there is no such thing as DP li-
censing/syntactic Case. Rather, it means that the existence of morphological 
case cannot be used to justify the assumption of syntactic Case, which thereby 
loses any advantage it might have had over the EPP in terms of independent 
empirical motivation. Therefore, an attempt to reduce the redundancy between 
the two cannot begin by assuming that Case is untouchable. 
11See Schtitze (1997,2001) for extensive additional data and argumentation for this 
analysis. Some additional environments where he suggests default case may be show-
ing up are conjoined subjects, appositives, ellipsis contexts, bare DP replies to ques-
tions and the subjects of small clauses, Mad Magazine sentences and NP-ing gerunds. 
12While it is true that some degree of separation has been implicit since the concept 
of quirky Case was introduced into the theory, mismatches between syntactic and mor-
phological case have generally been treated solely as lexical exceptions, not necessarily 
indicative of anything deeper. That is, it is still assumed that morphological case spells 
out syntactic Case unless inherent or quirky case intervenes. For example, Chomsky 
(2001) revises his view on how uninterpretable features are checked off in order to pre-
serve precisely this connection. Adopting the DM view that phonological material is 
inserted after Spell-Out, he proposes that checking of features cannot amount to their 
deletion as was previously assumed. Rather, it must consist in feature 'specification.' 
This is only necessary because he still intends for syntactic Case features to be instru-
mental in the determination of morphological case. 
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3 Why do DPs really move? 
We are left then with two poorly understood principles, each lacking credible 
external motivation, both working to regulate the position of DPs. Yet there 
are empirical arguments for both, and eliminating either one in a satisfactory 
way that deals with all of these arguments will be difficult, perhaps even im-
possible. Indeed, it's difficult to know where to start, since we have no a priori 
reason to think that either set of arguments is more convincing than the other. 
Nonetheless, if we consider what each principle actually claims at a concep-
tual level, I think there may be reason to choose between them. It is a given 
that certain DPs move to get into a local relationship with certain heads. The 
premise of abstract Case is that this occurs (at least in part) to satisfy needs 
of the DP, while the premise of the EPP is that it occurs (at least in part) to 
satisfy needs of the functional head. The question is whether both ideas are 
correct, as is generally assumed, or just one. I submit that there are (at least) 
three reasons to think that it is only the needs of the functional heads that drive 
the movement. 13 
In the first place, only those DPs that end up with 'structural' Case are 
required to move to be licensed. Objects of prepositions and DPs receiving 
inherent or semantic case 14 have no such requirements. This is somewhat 
unexpected if Case-licensing is a universal requirement of DPs. The standard 
assumption is that these types of DPs are 'licensed in situ', perhaps by the 
P head, but it would be simpler to assume that they never need licensing to 
begin with. (Why should the complement of P be licensed in situ while the 
complement of V is not?) We need only make the assumption defended here 
that movement is to satisfy the EPP. The question then is why objects of Ps 
cannot move to satisfy the EPP, and the answer is that A-movement out ofPPs 
is generally banned. 15 When, for whatever reason, this ban does not apply, as 
in cases of preposition stranding, the DP can move to satisfy the EPP. 
13It is interesting to note that the researchers who wish to eliminate the EPP do 
not consider the problem from this point of view and do not argue that features of 
the functional heads play no role. Indeed, as pointed out above, most of them rely 
on the ICF, a requirement that certain functional heads actually check Case. Perhaps it 
should count as an advantage for my attempt to eliminate Case that it does not postulate 
movement-driving features on both DPs and functional heads, but only on the latter. 
14Examples of semantic case would be nouns bearing 'adverbial' cases like the in-
strumental or the locative. See McFadden (2001) for discussion of how to assimilate 
the behavior of inherent and semantic case-marked DPs to that of prepositional objects. 
15 At this point, this is a stipulation, but no more of a stipulation than to say that P 
(unlike V) can always assign Case. 
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In the second place, a DP which would otherwise raise to subject position 
is not forced to when a replacement is present to raise in its place. This is 
so for the associate of there-type expletives, and for both objects in passive 
double object constructions in Icelandic (from Freidin and Sprouse 1991): 
(13) a. Eg syndi henni bflinn. 
I-NOM showed her-DAT the-car-ACC 
'I showed her the car.' 
b. Bfllinn var syndur henni. 
the-car-NOM was shown her-DAT 
'The car was shown to her.' 
c. Henni var syndur bfllinn. 
her-DAT was shown the-car-NOM 
'She was shown the car.' 
Example 13a is an active double object sentence, which can be passivized 
either as in 13b or 13c. One of the objects must raise to the vacated subject 
position, but it can be either one, while the other remains happily within the 
VP. 16 Again, this is unexpected if movement is driven by the need for DP-
licensing. That is, if bl1linn has to raise to subject to be licensed in 13b, how 
does it get away with not moving in 13c? Of course, a number of explanations 
for this type of behavior have been given, involving either mediated licensing 
through there-expletives or something like long-distance Agree. However, if 
DP-licensing plays no role in driving movement, such ad hoc mechanisms are 
unnecessary. Indeed, this pattern is precisely what the EPP predicts: some DP 
must appear in the relevant specifier position, but once one of them does so, 
all others are free to remain where they are. 
In the third place, it seems that the only DPs tbat are always required to 
raise are underlying subjects. Even in non-finite clauses where no subject Case 
is at stake, subjects never remain VP-intemal: 17 
(14) a. * ... to John eat beans. 
b. .. .John to eat beans. 
Objects, on the other hand, frequently do remain VP-intemal, like beans in 
16That it is still within VP is shown by the fact that it follows both the inflected 
auxiliary and the passive participle. 
17 Similar data presented in 4 above could be accounted for by saying that OS is overt 
and obligatory in English ECM sentences, but the pattern exemplified by 14 generalizes 
to for. .. to infinitives as well, where there is no question of OS. Thanks to Tony Kroch 
for pointing out this argument. 
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14b above. 18 If the driving force for movement out of the VP is a DP's need 
for licensing, there is no reason why there should be an asymmetry between 
objects and subjects, since both should be equally in need of licensing from 
Case.19 However, if it is the EPP that drives such movement, then the asym-
metry is predicted. By relativized minimality, the highest DP will be the one 
to raise to satisfy the EPP, and this will always be the underlying subject if 
there is one. The underlying object will only raise when the absence of an un-
derlying subject makes it the highest argument, as in passive and unaccusative 
constructions. 
4 What would we do without Case? 
We thus have reason at a basic level to think that A-movement is driven by the 
needs of functional heads, not by licensing requirements on DPs. When we 
get down to the empirical details, however, we are left with a number of facts 
which Case has been instrumental in accounting for. If we want to eliminate 
Case from our theory of grammar, these facts will require new (and better) 
explanations. It is far from clear at this point whether that will be possible. It 
may well be that, the argumentation in the previous sections notwithstanding, 
syntactic Case does too much work for us to do without it. However, the previ-
ous sections should make us sufficiently suspicious of Case to justify a serious 
attempt to capture the relevant data in a different way. In this final section I 
will therefore review what I consider to be the two major empirical arguments 
in favor of Case and suggest how they might be dealt with differently. 
The first argument comes from the fact that DPs are not allowed to un-
dergo A-movement out of finite subject position, as in 15: 20 
18 As mentioned above, Lasnik (200 1) argues convincingly that if overt OS is possi-
ble in English, it is optional. That is, some objects do indeed remain VP-internal. 
19This is what led to the postulation of AgrO beside AgrS in early versions of Min-
imalism. If subjects have to raise to get Case, then so should objects, since we have 
no reason to expect an asymmetry. The fact that objects do not appear to raise in En-
glish forced the assumption that movement to AgrO for Case-checking is at LF. Again, 
concerns of symmetry demanded this must be so for raising to AgrS as well, bringing 
us back to the conclusion that overt subject raising was to satisfy the EPP, and not for 
Case. 
20It is typically claimed that A-movement is blocked out of Case positions in general, 
but this is too strong. I have argued above that movement out of object position is only 
blocked by the presence of a higher subject, not by the possibility of Case assignment 
in situ, and we know that movement out of PPs that otherwise seem to assign Case 
is possible under certain circumstances in English. This is in clear contrast to finite 
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(15) * Johni seems [c p ti is sick.] 
(16) [c p That John had the flu] was obvious. 
This is typically captured by saying that once John checks off its Case feature 
in the subordinate clause it is barred from doing so in the matrix clause, but 
this movement can be blocked without reference to Case. I think the most 
promising possibility is a type of relativized minimality account. Given the 
possibility of 16, it would seem that finite clauses can be subjects, i.e. they 
can satisfy the EPP. If this is so, then movement of John to satisfy the EPP 
in 15 would be blocked because the clause is a closer potential satisfier. This 
follows straightforwardly if we adopt the traditional idea that clausal comple-
ments are essentially nominal structures. 21 •22 An analysis of this sort has a 
crucial advantage over the one based on Case. As noted in footnote 20, the ab-
solute restriction on A-movement only applies to finite subjects, not to objects. 
Under the Case-based account, this asymmetry is unexpected, and requires an 
additional explanation, 23 but under the RM account it is correctly predicted. 
Essentially, this says that A-movement is clause-bounded, and since the sub-
ject is the highest A-position in the clause, no further movement is possible 
from it, but movement from object position is fine as long as the subject posi-
subject positions, from which A-movement never seems to be possible. 
21 See Rosenbaum (1967) for the classic exposition of this idea. Using updated ter-
minology, in sentences like 16, the CP is embedded in a dummy DP which actually 
satisfies the EPP. Given such an analysis, the RM story is simple. To raise to sub-
ject position, the DP John in 15 would have to move past the CP and the dummy DP 
in which it is embedded, precisely the sort of configuration that RM is meant to rule 
out. Independent evidence in favor of the CP within DP analysis of finite subordinate 
clauses will be given below. 
22This could also follow from Chomsky 's (2000,2001) Phase Impenetrability Con-
dition. If CP constitutes a phase, then it will be a barrier to A-movement, since neither 
position at its edge, i.e. C or Spec-CP, is an A-position. A-movement thus has no 
'escape-hatch'. At some level, this says the same thing as the RM account: finite CP is 
a barrier to A-movement. 
23Thus it is typically assumed that passive and unaccusative verbs fail to assign ac-
cusative Case, thus allowing/forcing their internal arguments to raise to subject posi-
tion. This is frequently stated in the form of Burzio's Generalization (Burzio (1986)), 
by which internal Case assignment is dependent on the external 9-role assignment. 
However, as Burzio (2000) has himself pointed out, BG was never an explanatory prin-
ciple, but rather a descriptive generalization. Indeed, a serious stipulation was always 
required to connect internal Case to external 9-role. Instead, Burzio (2000) endorses 
an account similar to the one here, where the EPP drives movement and BG is derived 
in the process. 
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tion above it is still open. 
The second argument for the existence of Case comes from examples like 
17a (taken from Martin (1999)): 
( 17) a. * It seems [J p several students to have been arrested.] 
b. Several studentsi seem [J p ti to have been arrested.] 
c. It seems [c p that several students have been arrested.] 
The normal account of this sentence is that several students cannot check its 
Case feature, since non-finite T doesn't check Case, and seem is not an ECM 
verb. If we eliminate Case, we have a problem, because everything else seems 
to be fine: the EPP and 9-criterion are satisfied in both clauses, and there 
is nothing wrong semantically. Looking for an alternative to Case, Marantz 
(199112000) argues that the problem with 17a is that the insertion of expletive 
it is illicit. The suggestion is that it can only be inserted as a last resort, when 
nothing else is able to satisfy the EPP. In 17b, several students is available to 
potentially satisfy the matrix EPP, but as noted above, such raising is blocked 
in 17c, so in such an instance (and only such an instance), expletive it comes 
to the rescue. 
However, a serious difficulty for this approach is presented by the follow-
ing alternation: 
(18) It seems clear [c p that John is sick.] 
(19) [c p That John is sick] seems clear. 
Given the possibility of raising the CP to satisfy the EPP in 19, insertion of it 
should be illicit in 18. Since 18 is clearly fine, insertion of expletive it cannot 
only be allowed as a last resort, and thus we cannot say that insertion of it in 
17a is blocked by the possibility of raising several students as in 17b. 
However, there is potentially a different problem with it in 17a. Above I 
suggested, following the traditional analysis in Rosenbaum (1967), that those 
types of clause from which A-movement is barred might actually have an un-
derlying DP structure. In fact, these are precisely the same clause-types that 
can appear in subject position and that can be embedded in a clause with an 
expletive-it subject: 
(20) a. * Johni seems likely [that ti is sick]. (finite clauses) 
b. [That John is sick] seems likely. 
c. It seems likely [that John is sick] . 
(21) a. * Johni would be odd [forti to be sick] . (jor. .. to clauses) 
b. [For John to be sick] would be odd. 
c. It would be odd [for John to be sick] . 
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(22) a. * PROi would be odd [ti to be sick]. (PRO clauses) 
b. [PRO To be sick] would be odd. 
c. It would be odd [ti to be sick]. 
(23) a. Johni seems likely [ti to be sick]. (raising verb complements) 
b. *[John to be sick] seems likely. 
c. *It seems likely [John to be sick]. 
This pattern can be explained if we adopt the hypothesis that the first three 
clause types above (but not the fourth) are in fact embedded in a dummy DP. 
This explains why they can appear as subjects and objects (cf. I expect that 
John will be sick). Furthermore, we can say that expletive it is simply how the 
dummy D head is spelled out when it is separated from the CP. 24 What rules 
out sentences like 17a and 23c is that the complement clause of a raising verb, 
not being embedded within a dummy DP, can never raise to subject position, 
as shown by 23b, and thus can never strand the dummy DP there to be spelled 
out as expletive it. 
All of this amounts roughly to saying that the embedded clauses that ap-
pear in the c sentences above are the associates of expletive it. It should not 
be surprising, then, that just as expletive there places selectional restrictions 
on its DP associate, expletive it only works with certain clause-types. Note 
that this also allows us to explain a difference between it- and there-type ex-
pletives that otherwise must be stipulated. With there-type expletives it is the 
associate and not the expletive that controls verb agreement, while it-type ex-
pletives seem to control the agreement themselves. However, if expletive it 
has a clausal associate, then agreement is really always with the associate. It 
just so happens that all clauses are third person singular, giving the appearance 
that it is triggering agreement itself. 
Clearly, a great deal of research is necessary to make the details of this 
analysis work. In particular, it will be necessary to flesh out the theory of the 
selection of subordinate clause types and expletive-associate relationships that 
is adopted above. 25 At this point it remains to be seen whether the traditional 
story as found in Rosenbaum (1967) can be translated into modem terms in 
a way that is attractive and can overcome the objections that led to its aban-
24Exactly how we would analyze this is an open question. Rosenbaum's analysis 
is that the CP can optionally extrapose. In other words, in both the b and c sentences 
above, the full DP raises to subject position, after which, only in the c examples, the 
embedded clause extraposes, leaving the DP essentially stranded. When it is stranded, 
the DP must be spelled out as it. 
25For example, why is it that finite clauses,for. .. to infinitives and PRO infinitives can 
be embedded in dummy DPs while raising and ECM infinitives apparently cannot? 
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donment in favor of the Case-theoretic account in the first place. Until such 
time as this has been done, the solutions proposed in this final section must be 
regarded as speculative and somewhat stipulative (although perhaps no more 
so than the syntactic Case alternative). Thus I cannot yet say that I have elim-
inated the need for syntactic Case. Nevertheless, I have laid out in this paper 
just what is at stake in doing so and hope to have shown that such a move has 
better motivation than the frequent attempts to eliminate the EPP. 
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